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Oil  Revenue, the Real Exchange Rate and Sectoral Distortion in Angola 
 
 Abstract 
 
 
 
 This paper discusses the current status of the Angolan macroeconomy, with a particular 
focus on the role of oil income both now and in the future.  Emphasis is placed on the distortions 
that can result from large inflows of foreign exchange both in terms of the real exchange rate and 
also in terms of bias in sectoral growth rates. 
 
 At the present time Angola is in the second year of a de facto policy of exchange rate 
based stabilization wherein the government is using large purchases of domestic currency to 
reduce the excess liquidity generated by deficit spending.  This policy of “sterilization” of 
government spending has resulted in a quasi-fixed exchange rate at a level between 80 and 90 
Kwanzas to the US Dollar.  While inflation has declined substantially, prices have climbed more 
than 31% over the past year, a rate approximately half that of 2003.  The result has been a sharp 
real appreciation of the Kwanza and a consequent decline in incentives to produce traded goods.  
Finding a sustainable way to transition from this expensive policy will be key to a successful 
rehabilitation and reconstruction of Angola’s war torn economy. 
 
 By any measure the extent of the appreciation has been large.  While it is impossible to 
assign a precise number to the extent of overvaluation it is possible to compare the current 
situation with the recent past to give an idea of what the nominal exchange rate would be if 
depreciation had kept pace with the inflation in consumer prices that has continued unabated 
over the past years.  These calculations suggest that a nominal depreciation of as much as 50% 
would be needed to restore the real exchange rate to the level of only three to four years ago. 
 
 There can be little doubt that oil revenue and the real appreciation that it has caused has 
resulted in serious distortion of the economy even beyond that caused by war.  While there have 
been various theoretical reformulations of the precise channels through which the classical 
“resource curse” symptom of a stagnating non-oil traded sector can occur, there is general 
agreement on the observed fact of this outcome.  It is worth noting that virtually all channels 
identified in the literature can, at least potentially, be contributing factors in the Angolan case, 
including both the classical direct disincentive effects of an appreciated exchange rate, resource 
pull out of traded sectors toward urban and oil financed sectors, and an inability for non-oil 
sectors to invest due to high risk premiums caused by high variability in relative prices and hence 
profitability.   
 
Using an index developed to measure the extent of sectoral distortion in oil economies, 
the extent of this sectoral distortion is evaluated in the Angolan case.  The results show that the 
Angolan economy is among the most severely distorted of any included in previous analyses, 
including some oil economies in the Persian Gulf.   
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Oil  Revenue and Long Run Growth in Angola 
 
 
I.  Introduction 
 
 Angola is more dependent on oil than any other country in Sub Saharan Africa and most 
other countries as well, apart from a handful of OPEC members. Contributing  half or more of 
GDP, oil revenues condition and distort every other macroeconomic variable in the country, a 
situation that has existed for decades. While the degree of dependence varies with world oil 
prices, and has decreased somewhat at times, it will inevitably rise sharply over the next few 
years as new production comes on line.  Angolan reliance on oil income is extreme even when 
compared to other countries with heavy dependence on mineral exports.  Table 1 compares 
Angola to other mineral economies and shows that oil dependence is greater than in any other 
country listed, including those in the Persian Gulf. 
 
 The long standing nature of oil dependence in Angola together with its extreme nature  
has led to a severe case of what is commonly called “Dutch Disease” or the “resource curse”, a 
syndrome common to countries which are the recipients of large (relative to their economies) 
inflows of foreign exchange.   While the source need not necessarily be oil, this is the most 
common root of the problem in the period since the first oil shock in the early 1970’s.  In the 
Angolan case, the problem is exacerbated to some extent by diamond earnings though these are 
of secondary importance when compared to oil. 
 
 Appreciation of the real exchange rate is the main macroeconomic distortion resulting 
from large inflows of mineral income.  As will be shown in detail below, there is a marked 
tendency for the Angolan Kwanza to appreciate in recent years,  and continuation of this trend is 
one of the biggest threats to economic rehabilitation of Angola’s war-torn non-oil economy.  
However, the appreciation tendency has been even more pronounced for the past year and a half 
due to the “hard Kwanza” policy of fighting inflation by supporting the exchange rate at a more 
or less constant level. 
 1
  
 
Table 1 
Mineral Income as Percent of Government Revenue and GDP 
in Mineral Exporting Countries* 
 
 
 
Country 
Nonrenewable Resource 
Revenue as Percent of 
Total Government 
Revenue 
Nonrenewable Resource 
Exports as Percent of 
GDP 
   
Chile 8.6 10.1 
Kuwait 59.3 39.7 
Norway 14.4 12.1 
Oman 77.3 35.9 
Papua New Guinea 11.4 27.9 
Venezuela 58.2 19.1 
Angola 84.0** 48.5*** 
 
* All non-Angolan figures taken from Davis, Ossowski & Fedelino Eds. Fiscal Policy Formulation and 
Implementation in Oil Producing Countries, IMF 2003, p. 275 
** Average of 1996-2003 
*** Average of 2002 and 2003 
 
 
 A second major distortion resulting from the “resource curse” syndrome is a strong 
tendency toward urban bias and centralization of activities in the capital city.  This is particularly 
pronounced in oil economies where the sole recipient of the revenues in the first instance is the 
central government.  As the center of money and power, Luanda is the focal point of economic 
activity, and investment in oil-related activities (including rent-seeking) yield a far superior 
return to anything possible in rural areas.  Accordingly, both labor and capital are drawn to the 
center, to the detriment of rural areas and rural activities.  Within cities themselves there is a 
disincentive to manufacturing production due to competition from low cost imports resulting 
from the appreciated exchange rate.   Service sectors and non traded goods production expand 
instead. 
 
 These common characteristics of mineral economies have been exacerbated in Angola by 
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two other factors: 
 
1. Insecurity in rural areas through the civil war resulted in large portions of the country being 
virtually cut off from the outside world.  Apart from the  insecurity, the widespread destruction 
and deterioration of infrastructure, especially roads, added to the isolation in many areas.   Huge 
migrations of people seeking the relative safety of cities and towns skewed the population toward 
urban locations far more than would normally have been the case in a country of Angola’s 
degree of development even after accounting for the “usual” resource curse effects. 
 
2.  Angola’s government has historically been extremely centralized – indeed, the ruling MPLA 
was originally an avowedly Marxist party espousing a command economy strategy of 
development.  While this is a thing of the past, the MPLA still retains strong centralizing 
tendencies, a factor which tends to increase the degree of urban bias seen.  Though recent 
changes have moved toward more decentralization of government functions, there is still some 
way to go in this process. 
 
 The next section discusses the recent performance of the Angolan economy.  This is 
followed by sections discussing theoretical issues in resource rich economies and measurements 
of the extent of economic distortion in Angola.  This is followed by a discussion of the optimal 
path of consumption financed by oil wealth and the possibility of establishing an institutional 
mechanism for saving oil income.  The final section discusses issues of what a sectoral 
investment program might look like and the political economy of implementing this in Angola. 
 
 
II. Recent Evolution of the Angolan Economy 
 
A. Growth 
 
 Annex Tables 1-5 and Figures 1 and 2  present data on the evolution of the Angolan 
economy over the past several years.  It can be immediately seen that growth has been anemic at 
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best, and negative in many years.  Only when oil prices and/or production rise does growth rise 
as well, reflecting the extreme oil dependence of the Angolan economy.  This situation was in 
fact almost inevitable over the many years of conflict, when production in rural areas was 
virtually impossible. 
 
  The dislocations caused by the conflict make even the data that do exist less than 
completely reliable.  The government’s statistical network is largely non-existent outside of 
major cities, with even the size of the population a subject of some debate.  Oil production 
estimates are better known, though the disposition of oil receipts is a major bone of contention 
between the government and international lending institutions.  Allegations of huge diversions 
have been made but verification of these claims has been difficult. 
 
 It is striking that agriculture accounts for only a very small share of GDP even though the 
majority of the population is employed in that sector.  This is a testimony not only to the 
dominance of oil in the economy but also to the extremely low productivity of much of 
smallholder production. 
 
 Overall GDP growth in 2003 was 3.4%, largely due to the performance of the oil sector.  
This growth rate is expected to have increased to about  12% in 2004 and 2005 and to go even 
higher in 2006 and beyond.  These projections rely on oil production estimates and as such are 
contingent upon the state of the world oil market.  While physical production estimates can be 
made with some level of confidence, world oil prices are, of course, dependent upon a host of 
factors well beyond the control of Angola. 
 
 The experience of other post-conflict countries indicates that a strong growth rate can be 
expected during the process of resettlement and reactivation of subsistence production.  Indeed, 
when a family’s production starts from zero, as is the case with millions of deslocados, any 
amount of production at all will look large when stated in terms of growth rates.  The more 
difficult task will be the period after resettlement and rehabilitation, when growth depends on the 
success of rural development policies more generally.  In addition, as farmers move beyond 
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subsistence production to selling marketed surplus in cities, the effects of exchange rate 
distortions and competing grain imports will also have a powerful effect on output growth.  
Projections currently forecast growth of between 10 and 15% per annum in agriculture over the 
next 4-5 years as the post-conflict surge in production occurs. 
 
 
B. Inflation and Fiscal Deficits 
 
 For many years following independence Angola went through a series of 
hyperinflationary episodes followed by stabilization/control policy packages and then renewed 
inflation.  The root cause of these cycles was monetization of fiscal deficits.   Spending fueled by 
oil receipts would be unsustainable after a period of growth, with declining oil receipts from 
either production declines or adverse price movements often triggering increased money 
financing of deficits. 
 
 Throughout these cycles the government struggled to come to terms with the various 
international economic organizations but was unable to consistently adhere to the terms required 
by the IMF for approval.  At this moment, Angola is at the beginning of a period in which very 
large new oil receipts pose both dangers and opportunities for macroeconomic management.  
While real exchange rate distortions are an inevitable problem given the size of the foreign 
exchange inflows, the new revenue also presents an opportunity for the government to establish 
control over fiscal operations and to try to maintain stability in macro aggregates.  
 
 In fact, there are signs of movement toward renewed stability already, with inflation in 
2004  at about 35-40%, or about half of the 2003 figure of 75%.  The improvement is largely due 
to the government’s avoidance of money creation for deficit finance purposes together with a 
smaller deficit , a performance which continues the experience of 2003 which also showed a 
marked improvement over the previous year.  The government has used a combination of oil 
receipts and international borrowing to cover its expenses, and though this creates other 
problems it has allowed the rate of inflation to be kept low when combined with the policy of 
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using foreign exchange reserves to buy Kwanzas in order to sterilize large oil financed 
expenditures.  It is hoped that inflation in 2005 can brought to level even lower than the 35-40% 
registered in 2004.  Figure 3 shows the evolution of the CPI in Luanda over the past five years.  
It can be seen that from an index of 100 at the end of 2001 the CPI has now reached a level of 
around 470. 
 
 There is still work to be done in achieving the degree of expenditure control needed for 
maintenance of stability in a sustainable manner.  However, the government has made enormous 
progress in consolidating and unifying the reporting of government receipts and expenditures, so 
that the situation at the present time is markedly better than in the past.  Even so, though a far 
greater share of expenditures are now accounted for within the system, there remain government 
entities and quasi-fiscal expenditures which still need additional attention. 
 
 Another area of substantial progress has been the accounting and management of foreign 
debt.  Previously, there was no consolidated accounting of the country’s foreign debt, so that 
planning and forecasting was likewise impossible.  With the support of the IMF and the World 
Bank, substantial progress toward this goal has been achieved as well.   
 
 Perhaps the biggest area of concern for donors has been that of transparency.  Inability to 
account for hundreds of millions of dollars of oil receipts dominated multilateral and bilateral 
relationships, and led to a deterioration of relations in the recent past.  The government has been 
moving toward resolving this issue as well, and if it follows through on the plans made for 
auditing and accounting at Sonangol, the Banco Nacional de Angola, and the Treasury, there will 
be a marked improvement in donor willingness to fund a broad range of development projects.  
However, at the present time,  particularly in the case of oil receipts, there remain unknowns in 
the figures. 
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Figure 3:  Angola - CPI in Luanda
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Figure 4: Angola Nominal Exchange Rate - Kwanzas per US Dollar
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C. Exchange Rates and the Balance of Payments 
 
 For virtually all of the 1990's, the official exchange rate was substantially overvalued, 
with the parallel market premium reaching levels well above 1000% at times.  This is one area 
where the government has been very successful since the year 2000, with the parallel premium 
usually less than 1%.  The Kwanza has stabilized at a level of around 80-90  to the US Dollar for 
the past year, but it should be noted that this is a period of substantial dollar depreciation vis a vis 
the Euro, so that the Kwanza has in reality been depreciating somewhat on a trade weighted 
basis.  In spite of this, the Balance of Payments is unlikely to respond to any great degree since 
virtually all exports are composed of oil and imports are as yet quite price unresponsive, given 
the lack of domestic substitutes for many of the imports to coastal cities.  Figure 4 shows the 
evolution of the exchange rate over the past five years.  Of particular interest is the clear change 
in the trend as of August 2003 where the effects of government activity in the foreign exchange 
market can be seen in the stabilization and appreciation of the nominal exchange rate through the 
last five months of the year.  Subsequently the government has permitted the exchange rate to 
slowly depreciate, reaching a level of about 89 by the end of 2004. 
         
 As noted above, the government has been financing the fiscal deficit largely with foreign 
exchange.  Effectively this means using foreign exchange  to buy Kwanzas in the open market 
with consequent dampening effect on inflation and the maintenance of an exchange rate 
substantially higher than would otherwise be the case.  The natural reaction of most economists 
to this type of situation is that it is not sustainable - at some point the availability of foreign 
exchange to continue the policy will become limited, leading to a fall in the currency and a new 
policy regime.   However, in the Angolan case the government will be receiving huge inflows of 
oil receipts starting this year as new production comes on line, meaning that this policy can be 
continued far longer than would be the case in most other countries.  The real question is whether 
this is the optimal use of foreign exchange reserves.  A better outcome could be achieved with a 
reduction of the government deficit and consequent reduction in the need to use exchange 
reserves to finance monetary intervention. 
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 Annex Table 2 shows the evolution of the Balance of Payments in recent years.  It can be 
seen that there has been a sizable deficit on the current account in every year until 2000, which 
was a peak in the oil market.  2002 also saw a positive current account and this is expected again 
in 2004.  While the trade balance is strongly positive in all years, the negative balance on the 
services account more than makes up for this difference in most cases.  It is also evident that 
foreign loans account for a large share of the flows recorded in the balance of payments, 
including large interest payments in the current account. 
 
 
D. Real Exchange Rate 
 
 The above discussion has unambiguous implications for the real exchange rate.  With the 
nominal rate stable or appreciating over the past year, and with inflation recorded at 76% in 2003 
and 31% in 2004, there has been a huge real appreciation.  This has not been a conscious policy 
objective of the government.  Rather, it is a result of the combination of policies in which the 
policy target is the rate of inflation, and the tool used to get there in the face of large fiscal 
deficits is the use of large quantities of foreign exchange for financing as discussed above. 
 
 This is the classic resource curse result and one which will be a major disaster for both 
domestic manufacturing and the agricultural sector if it continues.  Every farmer wishing to 
produce maize for the coastal urban market has been effectively taxed  over the past year by the 
real appreciation.  To date, farmers in the interior have been protected by virtue of their very 
isolation.  In addition, casual evidence indicates that they are still competitive in the inland 
provinces even at current exchange rates, but this will change if inflation continues while the 
exchange rate remains stable.  Manufacturing in coastal cities is already in a precarious situation 
given the lack of transportation barriers for import competition together with the still poor state 
of utilities and other services necessary for production. 
 
 The extent of the appreciation of the real exchange rate can be seen in Figure 5.  This 
index is calculated on the basis of the Banco Nacional de Angola’s reported informal market  
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 Figure 5:  Real Exchange Rate Index for Angola
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exchange rate against the US Dollar.  The respective CPI’s for each country are used to generate 
the real exchange rate.  It should be noted that the choice of a base year (in this case January of 
2001) is inevitably arbitrary.  This is particularly so in Angola, where there is no point in the 
recent past which can be regarded as “normal” or “stable”. 
 
 It is clear from the chart that there has been a steady appreciation of the real exchange 
rate over the 1999-2003 period.  Since January of 2001 the appreciation has amounted to more 
than 50%, a very substantial change.  As noted above, if the appreciation continues domestic 
producers will eventually be priced out of the market in coastal demand centers.    The case of 
Nigeria is instructive with respect to this point:  real exchange rate appreciation of the Nigerian 
naira was so extreme that domestic producers were in danger of being priced out of the domestic 
market altogether and not simply in coastal cities.  The same could conceivably occur in Angola 
if appreciation continues unchecked.1 
 
 It is therefore encouraging to see the relative stability of the real exchange rate through 
the Fall and Winter of 2004 due to the government policy of allowing the nominal exchange rate 
to depreciate more or less in line with the rate of inflation.  Even so, there remains a substantial 
built in level of overvaluation given the maintenance of the hard kwanza policy through a period 
of continued inflation.  In addition, the most recent data indicate that the trend toward real 
appreciation has continued though at a more moderate pace than at times in the recent past. 
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1    A real example can illustrate this:  Consider the cost of a ton of maize.  The prices measured for a ton of maize 
in different points in the country in April 2004 in local markets upon delivery by informal truckers from farm areas 
were reported in World Bank 2004 to range from less than $100/MT in Kuanza Sul to $184 in Huambo, $230 in 
Benguela and more than 300 in Luanda.    The prices of imported maize averaged about $115/ton in 2004 while 
transport from producing countries to Angola cost approximately $47.50.  If we add $20 for port costs and taxes (a 
reasonable estimate) we arrive at a landed price of $184 per ton.  It is immediately obvious that imported maize is 
cheaper than Angolan maize in the large coastal port cities.  However, to arrive at the cost of imported maize in the 
interior, we must add the cost of trucking from the port to these locations.   If we add the reported trucking cost of 
$50/MT from Lobito to Huambo to the landed cost of imported maize we get a figure of $244 which is only $60 
above the local price.  This competitive edge can be eroded either by further appreciation of the real exchange rate 
or alternatively by a drop in the cost of trucking maize from the coast to the interior.   This could well mean that 
Angolan farmers could become uncompetitive with imported product even in their own province or village. The 
same result would occur if international maize prices were to fall.  Annex Figures 1 and 2 show that international 
commodity prices are now at a relatively high point in terms of long run cycles, so this possibility cannot be 
discounted.  
 E. The Current “Hard Kwanza” Policy Regime  
 
 As noted above, for the past year and a half Angola has engaged in a policy of using oil 
revenues to stabilize the exchange rate at around 80-90 Kwanzas/US Dollar.  This policy has 
been justified as a way to deal with inflation resulting from continued fiscal deficits and the 
money creation used to finance them.  The standard response to this situation is a fiscal 
contraction combined with a devaluation of the currency in order to deal with exchange 
imbalances and problems in the balance of trade.  It is clear that such a strategy, as a matter both 
of arithmetic and the record of experience of countries that have pursued it, can succeed in 
ending both the inflationary process and imbalances in the international accounts.  Indeed, 
without fiscal control there can be no sustainable non-inflationary growth path. 
 
 However, the experience of other countries that have pursued such a contractionary path 
demonstrates that there is a serious cost to such a strategy - That is, the depth of the fiscal 
contraction required to achieve balance can be very large, with a correspondingly sharp recession 
or even depression as a result.  This recessionary impact is likely to be more pronounced the less 
responsive the demand for imports to changes in their price.  This is very probably the case in 
Angola, given the fact that Angolan substitutes for imported food and manufactures could not be 
easily produced in the extremely difficult conditions of a country only newly emerged from a 
long and destructive civil war. 
 
 Avoidance of a pronounced contraction had an obvious attraction to the government in 
the immediate aftermath of the newly achieved peace of 2002.  With domestic need for 
expenditure so large due both to poverty alleviation and rehabilitation, a fiscal retrenchment 
would inevitably mean a delay in addressing these issues.  Many critics have observed that most 
government expenditure was not (and still isn’t) really devoted to rehabilitation or poverty 
alleviation, going instead to politically favored recipients.  Even so, it can be argued that the very 
beginning of what for Angola is the third attempt at a peaceful beginning to development since 
independence is a particularly inopportune time to start a major campaign of stabilization based 
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fundamentally on cutting government support across wide swathes of the politically powerful in 
the country. 
 
 This meant the government had strong reasons to avoid a policy that would require an 
immediate fiscal contraction in favor of one which could achieve a measure of stability while 
postponing cuts in expenditure.  In addition, the government needed a visible success in 
economic management in order to build the political capital to take on the difficult task of 
reducing expenditure.  The policy chosen was exchange rate based stabilization.  Though the 
government does not view its policy package as an intentional application of this strategy, it is in 
fact indistinguishable from similar efforts taken in several other countries over the past two 
decades.  In Angola, the policy has meant that expenditures by the government which threaten to 
spark inflation due to the emission of large amounts of Kwanzas into the economy are countered 
by having the exchange authorities in the Banco Nacional de Angola purchase these excessive 
Kwanzas with dollars deriving either from oil receipts or from loans backed by promises of 
future oil receipts. 
 
 Among the benefits in the short run is the drop in the rate of inflation that we have 
witnessed in Angola over the past year and a half.  The second main effect (and according to the 
government, secondary in importance) is a quasi-fixed exchange rate.2   Preventing devaluation 
of the exchange rate has anti-inflationary influences of its own - hence the name “exchange rate 
based stabilization”.  The near fixity of the exchange rate means that there is a corresponding 
constancy in the prices of imported goods, eliminating inflationary pressures from this source.  
However, there are also significant costs to this policy - costs which grow as time goes on since  
increasing divergence of the exchange rate from what would be its market clearing rate in the 
absence of intervention requires increasing levels of intervention to maintain stability. 
 
 Fiscal control is an inescapable requirement of a sustainable exit from the current policy.  
Fiscal balance, at least in an intertemporal sense, is fundamental to any successful outcome to 
Angola’s experience with exchange rate based stabilization.  Though the delay in achieving this 
 16
initially need not mean the failure of the program or a necessary return to inflationary cycles, all 
observers agree that this adjustment must occur at some point if Angola is to emerge from this 
period to a sustainably stable macroeconomic situation rather than returning to a regime of 
alternating inflation and control. 
 
 There would be no reason to seek an alternative if the current policy regime could be 
continued indefinitely but historical experience in other countries and the situation in Angola 
today demonstrate that whether through action or inaction, something will change.  The lack of a 
sufficient fiscal adjustment is one reason to expect that this, at a minimum, must be corrected 
before the policy regime can be ended.   Some might object that Angola can go on for a long 
time due to its very large oil receipts which would allow funding of continued purchase of 
Kwanzas for a long time to come.   However, there are three powerful reasons to reject this 
option.  These are: 
 
1.   The Angolan government’s figures indicate that these expenditures have reached $250 
million per month.3  This is a very large amount of money, and one which, if continued at its 
current rate, would imply an expenditure of $3 billion this year to hold the exchange rate at its 
current level.  This amounts to more than $200 for every man woman and child in the country, an 
amount that could go far toward addressing poverty problems, not to mention the needs for 
investment in roads, bridges and other infrastructure destroyed in the war. 
 
 Furthermore, there is no reason to expect the amount needed to stabilize the exchange 
rate to remain at “only” $250 million per month.  Since the beginning of the policy there has 
been an unmistakable upward trend in the amount necessary to keep the exchange rate at its 
current level - and there is every reason to expect this to continue as the divergence between the 
quasi-fixed rate and the “natural” rate that we would see if there were no intervention grows.  
This divergence is a result of the fact that inflation has continued (though at a decreasing rate) 
and is expected to amount to somewhere in the neighborhood of 35-40% in 2004.   
                                                                                                                                                             
2  It can be considered “quasi” fixed in that it is not fixed by decree as in a true fixed exchange rate system but rather 
is fixed in a de facto sense. 
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3 See Jose Gasha and Gonzalo Pastor “Angola’s Fragile Stabilization” IMF Working Paper WP/04/83 May 2004 
 2.  As noted above, the appreciation of the “real” exchange rate over the past two years has made 
imports ever more competitive and exports ever less competitive as the inflation-driven rise of 
domestic costs has squeezed would-be producers who cannot raise their own sale prices because 
of the fixity of the exchange rate.  Constant international prices in dollar terms coupled with a 
fixed exchange rate means that prices of exports and imports don’t rise proportionately with 
other prices in the economy, and that these activities suffer from declining profitability and 
eventual abandonment as resources are attracted to other more profitable sectors.  This is exactly 
the analysis that is most commonly used to explain the collapse of Nigeria’s agricultural 
economy during its oil boom and period of extreme appreciation of the real exchange rate. 
 
3.  Perhaps the most important reason to seek an end to the current policy regime is the cost in 
terms of social and political conflict that could result.  The country is now embarking on a period 
of national reconciliation in which the successful resettlement of dislocated populations and 
former combatants is of paramount importance.  Part of the underpinnings of this success is the 
ability of these people to earn a living.  They will have difficulty doing this if the scenario 
described above comes to pass.  The result could be a  re-migration to urban areas or a 
resurgence of instability and insecurity in rural areas. 
 
 Recent work4 has shown that the long term failure to maintain stability in fiscal and 
exchange rate policy and outcomes has resulted in subnormal growth in Angola and Nigeria.  
Indeed, Angolan growth has been negative over the 1970-2000 period though this cannot be 
attributed solely to economic policy.  Nevertheless, the experience of the past and of other oil 
countries demonstrates the need for an end to the stop-go cycles of the past if growth outcomes 
are to be improved over what has occurred in recent years. 
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 III. Overvaluation, Economic Rehabilitation and Growth 
 
A. Economic Policy Response to Oil-Induced Distortions 
 
 As noted above, the classical resource curse distortion noted in the economic literature is 
appreciation of the real exchange rate, which causes stagnation in non-oil traded sectors of the 
economy.5  An alternative explanation focuses on the volatility of the real exchange rate in a 
relatively non-diversified economy such as Angola’s and finds the failure to diversify to be a 
result of the inability of capital markets to bear the risk inherent in the wide swings in relative 
prices and profitability.  The end result is similar to that in the classic resource curse literature in 
that there is underinvestment in non-oil traded activities and an inability of the capital structure 
to adjust when incentives are realigned in favor of these sectors.6 
 
 One possible reaction to this problem is to do nothing.  From this point of view, since oil 
yields huge sums of money over long periods of time, dependence is not really a curse at all, and 
should simply be embraced as a new reality to be lived with.  However, there are two problems 
with this: 
 
1.  Angola’s current oil receipts are large but oil reserves will eventually be exhausted.  Waiting 
until they run out (or world oil prices fall) is a recipe for disaster in the future since alternative 
economic income generation sources take many years to develop.  Infrastructure planning and 
construction can take decades so that it is important to plan ahead. 
 
2.  The large size of current revenues compared to the economy as a whole is causing distortions 
which have very adverse consequences for large segments of the population.  In fact the poorest 
                                                                                                                                                             
4 See, for example, Katz, Menachem, Ulrich Bartsch, Harinder Malothra and Milan Cuc “Lifting the Oil Curse - 
Improving Petroleum Revenue Management in Sub-Saharan Africa, International Monetary Fund, 2004. 
5 One of the best summaries of this literature can be found in Max Corden "Booming Sector and Dutch Disease 
Economics: A Survey," Oxford Economic Papers 36(3), November 1984, pp. 359-80.     
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6 See Ricardo Hausmann and Roberto Rigobon, “An Alternative Interpretation of the Resource Curse”, Chapter 2 in 
Davis, Ossowski and Fedelino Eds. Fiscal Policy Formulation and Implementation in Oil Producing Countries, 
IMF 2003. 
segments of society are part of this majority, including the vast majority of rural smallholders 
who constitute the bulk of the population.  Their welfare and incomes are important, which is 
why policies to address these problems are essential. 
 
 Economic theory suggests that one way to deal with the adverse effects of huge inflows 
of foreign exchange is to simply reduce the size of the flows by pumping out the oil more slowly.  
In effect, this strategy is to “save” the money by leaving it in the ground rather than spending it 
all as fast as possible.  A macroeconomically equivalent strategy would be to save the money 
overseas (e.g. by buying investments in financial assets in other countries) rather than injecting it 
into the domestic economy. 
 
   While the outlines of a savings strategy are discussed below it is nevertheless likely that 
much if not most of oil and diamond revenue will be spent as it comes in over the near future.  
Certainly expenditures will remain large relative to the non-oil economy for the foreseeable 
future. 
 
 This implies: 
 
1.  Some degree of real appreciation of the Kwanza is virtually unavoidable even if every 
possible effort is made to keep it to a minimum.  This means that there will be some inevitable 
disincentive effects on trade exposed sectors in terms of output prices, making necessary a 
strategy that takes this fact into account. 
 
 As noted above, the government has been supporting the exchange rate through 
purchases of excess liquidity with dollars.  However, any expenditure of dollars which causes the 
Kwanza to appreciate also taxes non-oil traded sectors by so doing.  Cheap manufactures 
undercut local producers in large urban markets on the coast.  Cheap grain imports reduce the 
margin which domestic producers can hope to earn on their own output.  This is particularly 
important at the present time, when one of the principal goals of agricultural policy is to 
reactivate national capacity to supply food needs. 
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 2.  Since the object of the strategy is to prevent the stagnation of sectors that will be necessary to 
sustain growth once the oil runs out, it is essential to reach some conclusion as to which these 
sectors are. 
 
  In economic terms the answer to this question is clear.  The root of the problem is that an 
appreciated exchange rate masks the comparative advantage of those sectors of the economy that 
would be exporting (or substituting for imports) in a non-distorted environment.  So, in terms of 
developing a sectoral strategy, the primary issue is to determine in which sectors the country has 
a comparative advantage.  While question cannot be answered with any real precision given the 
dynamic nature of comparative advantage and the inability of direct observation of cost 
structures in a distorted economy such as Angola’s it is nevertheless possible to say with some 
certainty that there are several areas where efficient import substitution and/or export could be 
easily achieved given proper investments and incentives. 
 
 As noted above, prior to the oil boom and conflicts of the 1980’s and 1990’s Angola had 
a strong light manufacturing sector and a large agricultural export sector.  Growth in the former 
is typical of countries in the early to middle stages of structural transformation and the standard 
nature of the technology involved combined with Angola’s low wage structure and the ready 
availability of raw materials in the form of food and fiber make it extremely likely that such 
activities can be efficiently conducted in Angola. 
 
 The agricultural sector is more dependent upon each country’s natural resource base but 
here both history and agroclimatic conditions make it clear that Angola has some of the best 
basic conditions for agriculture to be found in Sub Saharan Africa.  While not every crop can be 
grown profitably the range that can be produced is quite wide and the late colonial history of 
large grain and other exports points to the capacity of Angola for efficient agricultural production 
that is competitive on world markets. 
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B. The problem of agriculture 
 
 The analysis above is particularly relevant for the agricultural sector since an appreciated 
real exchange rate lowers the relative price of those goods which are exposed to international 
trade while at the same time raising the relative price of so-called “home goods” (or non-traded 
goods) which are not traded internationally.  Agriculture is perhaps the prototypical example of a 
sector which is trade-exposed.  An appreciated exchange rate means lower prices for all of those 
agricultural outputs which are either exported, or which face competition from imports.  
Angola’s shift from a major agricultural exporter to an importer is a result not only of the civil 
war, but also of these exchange rate distortions. 
 
 It is agriculture which has borne the brunt of these distortions given the fact that Angola 
enjoys a strong potential comparative advantage in the production of agricultural products.  
Indeed, prior to independence and the beginning of oil revenue flows, Angola was one of the 
four largest exporters in the world of coffee, and was also a major exporter of maize, a crop 
which is produced almost exclusively by smallholders using largely traditional technologies.  In 
addition to major exports, domestic agricultural production also supplied virtually all food needs 
of Angolan cities both on the coast and in the interior. 
 
 Now that the cessation of hostilities has allowed farming populations to return to their 
farms, Angola is in a position to reclaim its status as a major agricultural producer, but market 
links between interior producing regions and coastal demand centers and ports remain in poor 
condition.  Angola is now a large food importer, while exports of formerly important cash crops 
such as coffee have dwindled to virtually nothing.   Pervasively low prices for agricultural 
outputs will contribute to a stagnation of production and in the long run cause a diversion of 
investment and labor away from this sector and toward other pursuits. 
 
 This is particularly troubling in the Angolan case given the very close association of 
many of the poorest parts of the population with agricultural sources of income.  Stagnation in 
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agriculture means stagnation in efforts to alleviate poverty and the growth of major problems 
such as excessive urban migration and deterioration of traditional society in the countryside.  The 
political economy implications of this are especially noteworthy in the Angolan case given the 
recent history of conflict between the government and UNITA and are discussed at greater length 
below. 
 
 
C. Oil Income, Rents and Corruption 
 
 Another line of research in the economics literature points to the propensity of mineral 
(and especially oil) dependent economies to develop problems of rent seeking and corruption.7  
The argument is that the existence of oil income results in a scramble for these rents rather than 
efforts to engage in more productive activities.  In addition, these effects can cause institutions to 
become weak, which will itself have a detrimental effect on growth.  Isham et. al. find such a 
relationship in a cross section of countries8 while Sala-i-Martin and Subramanian9 study the case 
of Nigeria. 
 
 No observer of the Angolan experience would deny the powerful role that mineral 
income has played both in prolonging the civil war and in inducing corruption in various 
institutions of the government.  Frynas and Wood have documented direct linkages between oil 
bonus payments and government offensives during the conflict10 while numerous authors have 
written of the corruption surrounding oil revenue in Angola.11  Even casual empiricism confirms 
the entrenchment of corruption in everyday dealings with the government and few would argue 
against the corrosive influence of oil money on many of the institutions that deal with it. 
                                                 
7 See for example, Mauro, P, (1995) “Corruption and Growth” Quarterly Journal of Economics Vol. 90 pp. 681-712, 
and Leite, C. and M. Weidmann (1999)  “Does Mother Nature Corrupt?  Natural Resources, Corruption and 
Economic Growth, IMF Working Paper WP/99/85. 
8 See Isham, J, L. Pritchett, M. Woolcock, and G. Busby 2003 “The Varieties of the Resource Experience.  How 
Natural Resources Export Structures Affect the Political Economy of Economic Growth” mimeo, World Bank 2003. 
9 See Xavier Sala-i-Martin and Arvind Subramanian, “Addressing the Natural Resource Curse:  An Illustration from 
Nigeria”  NBER Working Paper 9804, June 2003. 
10 See Frynas JG, Wood G. "Oil & War in Angola", Review of African Political Economy 28(90): 587-606, 2001 for 
a discussion of this phenomenon. 
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  The work of Sali-i-Martin and Subramanian on Nigeria is perhaps the most directly 
relevant to the Angolan case.  They argue that corruption and institutional weakness has had a 
more important effect on Nigeria than has distortion of the real exchange rate.  They argue that 
even though Nigeria invested a large proportion of their windfall, the weakness of their 
institutions resulted in “bad” investments with very low returns.  They further argue against the 
importance of real exchange rate effects due to the fact that agriculture has remained stagnant 
even after appreciation has been reversed.  Their solution is that oil revenues should simply be 
distributed to citizens rather than spent by the government and that this would result in an 
increase in welfare. 
 
 While they may be correct in an ex post sense in the Nigerian case, there are reasons to 
doubt that their result is entirely applicable to the current Angolan situation.  First, to say that 
Nigerian investments were bad is not to say that all government investments will necessarily be 
bad.  Certainly the case of Indonesia provides a counterexample while in Angola there is no 
question that there are massive investments in public goods that are needed to rehabilitate the 
damage caused by the war.  Second, there are various reasons for the non-reversibility of 
agricultural stagnation, among them the fact that most migrants to urban areas were averse to 
remigration to rural areas, as well as adverse international market conditions for several of 
Nigeria’s former exports.  Indeed, it can be argued that the difficulties of reversing agricultural 
stagnation strengthen rather than weaken arguments for preventing this problem in the first place.  
Third, distribution of oil proceeds may well result in superior distributional consequences in a 
static sense, but they ignore intertemporal distribution issues between current and future 
generations.  This is particularly important in Angola given the huge need for public investments 
in physical infrastructure of all kinds as well as in education to allow the accumulation of human 
capital. 
 
 Nevertheless, Sala-i-Martin and Subramanian make a valid point in emphasizing the 
importance of institutional weakness in  exacerbating economic distortion and stagnation in oil 
                                                                                                                                                             
11 See, for example, Ian Gary and Terry Lynn Karl, “Bottom of the Barrel – Africa’s Oil Boom and the Poor”, 
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economies.  There is no doubt that efforts to promote transparency together with ongoing efforts 
to improve the formulation and implementation of fiscal policy are key prerequisites for Angola 
to successfully manage its oil income.  At the same time, it will also be important to do whatever 
is possible to ameliorate the problems of real exchange rate appreciation and the distortions that 
this can cause.  
 
 The next section of this paper discusses the degree of exchange rate appreciation that has 
occurred, and is followed by a discussion of the extent of sectoral distortion that has resulted, and 
an intertemporal analysis of Angolan oil income in order to arrive at a judgment as to the amount 
of consumption that can be financed by oil revenue. 
 
 
IV. “Equilibrium” Real Exchange Rate 
 
 It would be a mistake to imagine that it is possible to estimate exactly where the 
equilibrium real exchange rate for Angola is.  There are several reasons for this: 
 
-  There is so much instability in the economy since independence that there is no point which 
can be considered to be “in equilibrium” 
 
-  Regardless of past equilibrium, the structure of the economy has changed so much due to the 
civil conflict and oil revenue that any past equilibrium is a poor guide to the future.  This is true 
a fortiori when we consider even the known changes in store in the next decade including but not 
limited to large new oil receipts and resettlement and rehabilitation of the war-torn economy. 
 
-  Data are insufficient to allow econometric analysis of the issue 
 
 Nevertheless, it is instructive to look at the question from the point of view of restoring 
the value of the real exchange rate to different points in the past.  That is to say, if we were to 
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Caltholic Relief Services, June 2003. 
posit a change in the nominal exchange rate that would “undo” the real appreciation that has 
occurred since various points in the past, how large would that depreciation be? 
 
 Figure 5 and Table 2 below provide the answers to this question.  In November of 2004 
the real exchange rate index had a value of 51 given a base period of January 2001, and has in 
fact been stable at about this same level since May of 2004.  As noted above, the relative stability 
of the index for the past seven months shows that nominal depreciation is now keeping pace with 
inflation but does nothing to address the large built-in appreciation left over from the past.    In 
August of 2003 at the beginning of the “hard kwanza” policy the real exchange rate index had a 
value of 71.  Few observers of the Angolan economy would argue that the Kwanza was 
undervalued in real terms at that time. 
 
 In order to offset the almost 40% real appreciation since that time the nominal 
kwanza/dollar rate today would need to be 125.  Taking other dates further in the past yield 
larger required devaluations.  The period from around April of 2001 to February of 2002 was one 
of relative stability in the real exchange rate when it fluctuated in a relatively narrow range 
around a value of 80.  Restoration of the real exchange rate index to this level would require a 
current nominal rate of 140.  Going further back to January of 2001, a return of the index to its 
earlier level would imply a current nominal rate of 175. 
 
 Another interesting question is the extent to which future oil-derived foreign exchange 
inflows can be expected to cause further real exchange rate appreciation.  While there is no way 
to predict this without knowledge of how the money will be spent, it is possible to make some 
observations: 
 
-  The short run effect of the inflows on the real exchange rate depend crucially on whether the 
money is spent on traded or non-traded goods.  To take an extreme case, if all of the money were 
immediately spent on imported goods there would be little or no impact effect on the real 
exchange rate since there would be no money spent in the national economy.  Conversely, if all 
of the money were spent on non-traded goods (e.g. construction in Luanda, hiring workers, etc.) 
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then there would be an immediate and large impact.  Van Wijnbergen’s econometric estimates of 
the elasticity of the real exchange rate to foreign aid inflows in a cross section of African 
countries bears witness to the wide range of possible outcomes.  His estimates ranged from a low 
of 0.20 to a high of 0.87 over the time period studied.  His estimates of the elasticity of real 
wages to aid inflows ranged even higher, with values reaching as high as 2.5012 
 
- The long run effect depends on whether the money is spent on consumption or investment 
goods and in the latter case, on whether the investment is directed toward increasing productive 
capacity in the traded or non-traded sectors.  In the event that a large portion of the aid is devoted 
to increasing productive capacity, then this can help ameliorate inflationary pressures in the long 
run even though the short run impact might be inflationary.  This could happen if, for example, a 
large immediate expenditure on roads generated high demand for non-traded goods (from high 
labor requirements and domestic inputs) though the long run effect was to increase supplies of 
both traded and non-traded items.   
 
 Buffie, et. al. 2004 present a model of capital flows and exchange rates in Africa that 
demonstrates the different effects that can be expected from different values of the parameters.13   
Their analysis shows that given a credible commitment to low inflation a managed float of the 
currency is the best policy alternative.  This result is strengthened by the presence of large 
currency substitution effects such as those that exist in Angola.  When a large amount of 
domestic wealth is held in the form of foreign exchange the large capital inflows that can result 
require a more flexible and ad hoc approach by the authorities than a simple rule (floating, pre-
announced crawl, etc.) can permit. 
 
 Given all of these considerations it is likely that a minimum requirement for Angola to 
avoid real exchange rate related problems in the near future is to maintain the recent policy of 
depreciating in accordance with domestic inflation.  In addition, some additional depreciation to 
make up for the massive past appreciation will also be needed.  Management of this transition 
                                                 
12 See Sweder Van Wijnbergen, “Aid, Export Promotion and the Real Exchange Rate:  An African Dilemma?”  
Discussion Paper No. 199, World Bank 1996 
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will, however, need to be conducted carefully since too rapid a move or a move prior to adequate 
fiscal reform could spark a new round of inflation. 
 
 
 
Table  2 
Depreciation Needed to Restore Real Exchange Rate Index to Past Levels 
 
In Order to Restore Real 
Exchange Rate the Level of: 
When the Real Exchange 
Rate Index had a Value of: 
The Nominal Kwanza/Dollar 
Rate of January 2005 Would 
Need to be Depreciated to: 
January 2001 100 180 
April 2001 - February 2002 80 144 
August 2003 - Beginning of 
“Hard Kwanza” Policy 
71 128 
January 2005 (present) 49 88.42 (actual rate) 
 
 
 
V.  Measuring the Extent of Sectoral Distortion 
 
 The result of the syndrome described above is one of sectoral distortion where traded 
sectors other than those producing mineral revenue shrink while non-traded sectors grow.  
Measurement of this effect requires a counterfactual since the process of structural 
transformation in all growing economies results in the growth of some sectors and the shrinkage 
of others in terms of shares in output.  Chenery and Syrquin and various collaborators have 
analyzed this process exhaustively in various studies14 which define “normal” paths of structural 
                                                                                                                                                             
13 Edward Buffie, Christopher Adam, Stephen O’Connell, and Catherine Patillo, “Exchange Rate Policy and the 
Management of Official and Private Capital Flows in Africa”, IMF Staff Papers Vol. 51, 2004 
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14 See for example Hollis Chenery, Sherman Robinson and Moshe Syrquin, Industrialization and Growth Oxford 
University Press 1986 
transformation as countries transition from low income per capita to high. 
 
 Alan Gelb and associates use this “normal” structure to define a Dutch Disease Index to 
measure the extent of sectoral distortion in oil producing economies.15  This index is defined as: 
 
 DD  =  (SNag + SNma) – (Sag + Sma) 
 
SNag and SNma are the “normal” percentage shares of the traded sectors (agriculture and 
manufacturing) while  Sag and Sma are the shares of these same sectors in the oil exporting 
countries.  Gelb calculates this index for seven different countries in 1981 in the aftermath of the 
second oil shock in the 1970’s.  It should be noted that Gelb modifies the Chenery/Syrquin 
sectoral classification somewhat to eliminate construction from manufacturing since this is a 
predominantly non-traded sector which should not properly be considered as part of SNma in the 
analysis.  The data to perform this decomposition were not available for this analysis, but the 
results are nevertheless interesting.    
 
 Though an exact calculation of the index for Angola cannot be done without 
decomposing the Chenery/Syrquin benchmarks it is still possible to calculate upper and lower 
bounds for the value.  Since the benchmark measure of the size of the traded manufacturing 
sector (incorrectly) includes construction, a measure of Angolan manufacturing will overstate the 
value of the index somewhat if it excludes construction, while including construction will 
understate the value of the index due to the presumably larger than “normal” size of the non-
traded construction sector in the now distorted 2003 economy.  Accordingly both values are 
presented here since the true value lies somewhere between the two extremes. 
 
 Tables 3 and 4 show details of the calculation for Angola and the values of the index 
obtained by Gelb for his sample countries.  Following Gelb, the Angolan per capita GDP of $950 
in that year is deflated (using the US GDP deflator) to 1970 dollars as used in Chenery, Robinson 
and Syrquin’s 1986 computation of the “standard solution” at an income level of $140 per capita.  
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15 Alan Gelb Oil Windfalls, Blessing or Curse? Oxford University Press 1988. 
This corresponds fairly closely to 2003 Angolan non-oil GDP of $128 in 1970 prices.  Since 
Chenery and Syrquin chose this benchmark because it marks an income level before the onset of 
structural transformation, it is safe to use these same output shares at a slightly lower per capita 
income since their analysis indicates that no significant difference is observable at levels lower 
than this. 
 
 Angolan results are presented both with and without construction included in Sma  since 
as noted above it was not possible to disaggregate  SNma  to exclude construction from the 
“standard solution”.  In either case it is clear that Angola is at the extreme of sectoral distortion 
observed in Gelb’s sample.  The index value of 29 is higher than any reported by Gelb, while the 
value of 21 is higher than all but one.  It is interesting to note that on a sectoral basis both 
Angolan agriculture and manufacturing account for about half as large a share in non-oil GDP as 
would be expected in a non-mineral country at the same income level.  It is safe to conclude that 
regardless of small differences in computation, Angola ranks among the most extremely 
distorted in terms of sectoral production shares of any oil exporting country outside of the 
Persian Gulf region. 
 
 The distortion in the index results primarily from the extremely small share of GDP 
produced in the agricultural sector in Angola at the present time.  While much of this can be 
attributed to the dislocation caused by the long period of hostilities, the distortions caused by 
exchange rate overvaluation will impede the reactivation that would ordinarily be expected after 
the end of the conflict.  The clearly inflated size of the non-tradables sector is all the more 
notable given the exclusion of construction from that sector in the Angolan figures.  Were they 
included, the 74% share of nontradables in non-oil GDP would far outweigh the 47% in the 
benchmark standard solution. 
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Table  3  Dutch Disease Index and Sectoral Shares in GDP : Chenery/Syrquin “Standard 
Solution” vs. Angola in 2003 
 
Sectors Chenery/Syrquin 
Standard Soln. 
Angola 2003 Angola 2003 
  % of total % of non-oil 
Primary 38 61  
   of which    
Agriculture 37 8 17 
Mining 1 53  
    
Manufacturing 15 3.8 8 
   of which    
Food  5   
Consumer Goods 6   
Producer Goods 3   
Machinery 1   
Construction  3.6 8 
    
Nontradables 47 31 66 
   of which    
Social overhead 11   
Services 36   
    
DD index  ex. Construction  29 
DD index  incl.Construction  21 
Chenery/Syrquin figures from Chenery, Robinson & Syrquin op. cit. p. 49.  Angola figures from 
2004 IMF Article IV consultation report. 
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Table 4 
Dutch Disease Index – Various Countries 
 
       Country   Dutch Disease Index 
Algeria    11.2 
Ecuador      2.1 
Indonesia    -1.5 
 Iran       8.4 
 Nigeria    17.2 
 Trinidad    24.7 
 Venezuela    12.6 
Angola (lower bound)   21 
Angola (upper bound)   29 
 
 
Source: Angola from Table 3.  Other countries from Gelb 1988 p. 88. 
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Table A1.  ANGOLA:  Gross Domestic Product  
 
 Nominal GDP in Billions of Kwz Percentage Composition 
 1992  1998 2002   2003 1992   1998 2002 2003
          
Agriculture and Fishing 0.000000503000 0.3300000 79.5789000 84.85000 14.3 12.9 15.5 8.2
Crude and Gas 0.000001258000 0.9596000 251.0000000 498.50000 35.8 37.5 48.9 48.3
Other  Mining 0.000000090000 0.1357000 22.5000000 46.94000 2.6 5.3 4.4 4.6
Manufacturing 0.000000140000 0.1600000 17.5657000 39.30000 4.0 6.3 3.4 3.8
Electricity 0.000000002394 0.0019000 0.1813000 0.44500 0.1 0.1 0.0 0.0
Construction 0.000000189000 0.1560000 16.3751000 36.75000 5.4 6.1 3.2 3.6
Trade Services 0.000000591000 0.4899000 67.0941000 146.80000 16.8 19.2 13.1 14.2
Non-Trade Services 0.000000609000 0.2674000 50.3000000 155.90000 17.3 10.5 9.8 15.1
Import Customs Duties 0.000000131000 0.0553000 8.5229000 21.95000 3.7 2.2 1.7 2.1
Total GDP 0.000003513394 2.5558 513.1180 1031.4350 100.0 100.0 100.0 100.0
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 Table A2.  ANGOLA:  Balance of Payments, 1998-2004 
(in millions of dollars; unless otherwise stated) 
 1998 1999 2000 2001 2002 
 
2003 2004 
Est. 
 
Current account -1,867 -1,710 796
 
-1,431 
 
-150 -719 1,450
 
Trade balance 1,464 2,047 4,881
 
3,355 
 
4,568 4,028 7,239
  Exports, f.o.b. 3,543 5,157 7,921 6,534 8,328 9,508 13,971
     Crude oil 3,091 4,491 7,120 5,803 7,539 8,537 12,904
     Diamonds 432 629 739 689 638 788 838
     Other 20 37 62 43 45 35 39
  Imports, f.o.b. -2,079 -3,109 -3,040 -3,179 -3,760 -5,480 -6,732
Services (net) -2,514 -2,442 -2,432 -3,316 -3,115 -3,120 -3,556
  Receipts 122 153 267 203 207 201 221
  Payments -2,635 -2,595 -2,699 -3,518 -3,322 -3,321 -3,777
Income (net) -969 -1,372 -1,681 -1,561 -1,635 -1,726 -2,336
  Of which: Interest due 1/ -504 -569 -597 -539 -354 -268 -339
Current transfers (net) 152 56 28 91 32 99 102
 
Financial and capital account 
 
304 1,664 -450
 
954 
 
-508 934 1,224
Capital transfers (net) 8 7 18 4 0 0 0
Direct investments (net) 1,114 2,472 879 2,146 1,643 1,652 677
Medium- and long-term loans -974 -291 -766 -618 -393 298 1,303
  Disbursements 593 1,501 1,610 1,619 1,048 1,890 2,414
  Amortizations -1,567 -1,791 -2,376 -2,237 -1,441 -1,592 -1,110
Other Capital (net incl. E+0 2002-04) 156 -524 -580 -577 -1,758 -1,016 -757
   
Net errors and omissions 377 -80 -51 -365 - - -
   
Overall balance -1,186 -126 295 -842 -658 215 2,674
   
Net international reserves (-increase) 319 -530 -631 508 207 -301 -817
Exceptional financing 868 656 336 334 451 87 -1,857
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Table A2.  ANGOLA:  Balance of Payments, 1998-2004 (cont.) 
(in millions of dollars; unless otherwise stated) 
 1998 1999 2000 2001 2002 2003 2004 
Est. 
 
Memorandum items: 
  
   
  Current account (in % of GDP) -29.0 -28.1 9.0 -15.1 -1.4 -5.2 7.1
  Exports of goods & services (in % of 
GD) 
56.9 87.2 92.4 71.1 79.1 70.2 69.7
  Imports of goods & services (in % of 
GD) 
73.2 93.7 64.7 70.7 65.6 63.7 51.6
  Debt service ratio 2/ 56.5 44.4 36.3 41.2 40.0 39.0 17.0
Gross international resources (end of 
period) 
203 496 1,198 732 375 636 1,453
  In months of imports of goods & 
services 3/ 
0.4 1.0 2.1 1.1 0.5 0.7 1.5
  In months of debt service 3/ 1.0 2.0 5.2 3.9 2.4 5.3 9.6
 
Source:  Banco Nacional de Angola 
1/  Including late interest from 1999 onwards. 
2/ Medium- and long-term debt service due in percent of exports of goods and services. 
3/ In months of next year’s imports or medium- and long-term debt service.  In 2002, using current year’s data. 
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Table A3.  ANGOLA: Commodity Composition of Exports, 1998-2003 
(In Millions of U.S. dollars, unless otherwise indicated) 
 1998 1999 2000 2001 2002 
 
2003 
Est. 
   
Total exports 3,543 5,157 7,921 6,534 8,328 9,515 
   
  Crude oil 3,018 4,406 6,951 5,690 7,539 8,537 
    Volume (millions of barrels) 251 254 256 251 311.1 302.6 
    Price (U.S. dollars per barrel) 12 17 27 23 24.2 28.2 
   
  Refined petroleum products 62 75 132 93 95 139 
    Volume (thousands of metric tons) 666 720 734 675 674 718 
    Price (U.S. dollars per metric ton) 93 105 180 137 142 193 
   
Liquefied Natural Gas 11 9 37 20 10 16 
  Volume (thousands of barrels) 1,094 624 1,475 1,068 636 636 
  Price (U.S. dollars per barrel) 10 15 25 19 16 25 
   
Diamonds 432 629 739 689 638 788 
  Volume (thousands of carats) 2,765 3,806 4,319 5,159 5,020 6,060 
  Price (U.S. dollars per carat) 156 165 171 134 127 130 
   
  Other 20 37 62 43 45 35 
 
Source:  Banco Nacional de Angola 
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Table A4.  ANGOLA:  Public and Publicly-Guaranteed External Debt and Debt Service, 1999-2005  (in millions of U.S. dollars) 
1999       
 
Debt 
Outstanding Arrears  2000 2001 2002 2003 2004 2005
After 
2005
Principal         
         
Total, medium-and long-term debt 8,782.4 3,749.0 953.8 804.6 640.8 463.6 326.5 256.9 2,030.3
         of which: oil guaranteed  1/ 2,689.1 449.9 644.3 381.3 379.2 132.1 114.2 94.4 493.7
    Multilateral 243.1 90.0 5.0 5.0 6.0 5.6 6.0 5.5 120.0
    Official bilateral 5,344.4 2,351.0 296.0 293.3 283.3 272.6 160.1 151.5 1,536.8
           Paris Club pre-cutoff date 957.6 850.0 58.0 7.0 5.0 4.4 3.4 3.4 26.4
                   ODA 119.6 62.0 8.0 7.0 5.0 4.4 3.4 3.4 26.4
                    Non-ODA 838.0 788.0 50.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0
           Paris Club post-cutoff date 1,959.6 1,042.0 227.0 160.0 152.0 142.0 30.4 21.8 184.4
                    ODA 381.2 56.0 26.0 30.0 30.0 24.0 23.1 16.8 175.3
                    Non-ODA  1,578.4 986.0 201.0 130.0 122.0 118.0 7.3 5.0 9.1
           Other official bilateral creditors 2,427.3 459.0 11.0 126.3 126.3 126.3 126.3 126.3 1,326.0
                    Not previously rescheduled 360.0 349.0 11.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0
                    Rescheduled 2067.3 110.0 0.0 126.3 126.3126.3 126.3 126.3 1,326.0
    Private creditors 3,194.9 1,308.0 634.5 385.3 203.9 56.1 133.7 99.9 373.5
Interest on arrears  260.0 … … … … … … … 
    New debt … … 18.3 121.0 147.6 129.3 26.7 0.0 0.0
Short-term debt 809.0 691.0 118.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0
Total public debt 9,591.4 4,440.0 1,071.8 804.6 640.8 463.6 326.5 256.9 2,030.3
 
Memorandum items:  Total public debt    6,186.0
Oil guaranteed government debt 1/ 2,689.1 449.9 644.3 381.3 379.2 132.1 114.2 94.4 493.7
  a. to bilateral creditors 1,717.8 444.6 161.3 139.8 137.7 132.1 114.2 94.4 493.7
   Brazil 708.9 0.0 39.3 36.0 48.1 73.5 72.8 72.3 366.9
   Spain 770.7 400.1 70.4 57.3 51.9 31.5 20.7 12.0 126.8
   Portugal 238.2 44.5 51.6 46.5 37.7 27.1 20.7 10.1 0.0
  b. to other creditors 846.0 0.0 423.0 211.5 211.5 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0
  c. Sonangol w/ gov’t guarantee 125.3 5.3 60.0 30.0 30.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0
 
   
 40
Table A4.  ANGOLA:  Public and Publicly-Guaranteed External Debt and Debt Service, 1999-2005 (cont.) (in millions of U.S. dollars) 
   2000 2001 20042002 2003 2005
After 
2005
Interest         
         
  
 
   
 
Total, medium-and long-term debt 132.7 203.3 257.7 137.9 137.1 117.6 546.3
         of which: oil guaranteed  1/ 124.7 89.0 77.5 44.6 36.8 29.8 82.5
    Multilateral 1.8 1.6 1.0 1.0 1.1 1.0 11.0
    Official bilateral 43.0 148.5 131.0 119.0 99.4 91.0 470.0
           Paris Club pre-cutoff date 3.0 1.0 0.0 0.0 0.8 0.7 3.0
                   ODA 1.0 1.0 0.0 0.0 0.8 0.7 3.0
                    Non-ODA 2.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0
           Paris Club post-cutoff date 40.0 32.0 24.0 19.0 6.6 5.3 29.3
                    ODA 9.0 8.0 7.0 6.0 5.4 4.5 27.8
                    Non-ODA 31.0 24.0 17.0 13.0 1.2 0.8 1.5
           Other official bilateral creditors 0.0 115.5 107.0 100.0 92.0 85.0 437.7
                    Not previously rescheduled 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0
                    Rescheduled 0.0 115.5 92.0107.0 100.0 85.0 437.7
    Private creditors 86.4 43.5 113.9 7.6 34.6 25.6 65.3
Interest on arrears  304.1 141.1 141.1 141.1 141.1 141.1 141.1
    New debt   1.5 9.7 11.8 10.3 2.1 0.0 0.0
Short-term debt 9.4 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0
Total public debt 140.6 193.6 245.9 127.6 135.0
 
117.6 546.3
Memorandum items:  Total public debt  
 
  1,341.0
Oil guaranteed government debt 1/ 124.7 89.0 77.5 44.6 36.8 29.8 82.5
  a. to bilateral creditors 78.7 66.0 54.5 44.6 36.8 29.8 82.5
   Brazil 50.6 45.4 40.3 35.6 31.1 26.4 65.1
   Spain 15.7 11.5 8.2 5.5 4.0 3.1 17.4
   Portugal 12.4 9.1 6.0 3.5 1.7 0.3 0.0
  b. to other creditors 35.5 17.8 17.8 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0
  c. contracted by Sonangol with government 
      guarantee 10.5 5.3 5.3 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0
Source:  Angolan authorities; and staff estimates. 
1/ Projected using contract oil prices. 
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Table A5.  ANGOLA:  Summary of Government Operations, 1998-2004 
(in percent of GDP, unless otherwise indicated) 
 1998 1999 2000 2001 2002 
 
2003 
Prel. 
2004 
Est. 
 
Total revenue 31.6
 
46.8 51.7
 
42.5 
 
40.5 37.5 35.6
  Oil 23.4 41.1 46.2 33.9 31.0 28.2 27.4
  Non-oil 8.2 5.7 5.5 8.7 9.0 8.9 7.5
     Income taxes 2.1 1.6 1.5 2.5 2.6 2.7 2.3
     Taxes on goods and services 2.4 1.9 1.8 2.8 3.1 2.9 2.1
     Taxes on foreign trade 2.2 1.3 1.4 2.1 2.2 2.2 2.2
      Other 1.5 0.9 0.8 1.2 1.0 1.0 0.9
   
Total expenditure 43.0 82.4 60.8 46.3 49.8 45.5 39.8
  Current expenditure 36.5 51.1 44.8 33.6 36.9 36.7 30.6
     Personnel 9.2 4.2 5.9 7.7 11.3 12.5 11.2
     Goods and services 17.7 27.1 26.6 16.1 19.7 15.9 11.6
     Interest payments due 8.6 9.1 5.6 4.7 3.3 1.8 2.1
     Transfers 1.1 10.6 6.7 5.1 2.7 6.4 5.7
  Capital expenditure 5.9 12.9 6.3 6.0 10.6 7.7 5.8
  Central bank operational deficit … … 0.1 0.1 2.3 0.7 0.5
  Discrepancy (unexplained) 0.6 18.4 4.6 5.7 3.2 0 0
   
Change in payment arrears (net) 11.7 10.8 26.6 -1.1 7.8 0.7 1.3
  Domestic 3.9 3.2 22.9 -3.6 6.8 0.4 0.4
  External interest 7.7 7.6 3.7 2.5 1.0 0.2 0.9
   
Overall balance before grants (cash basis) 0.2 -
24.7
17.6 -4.9 -1.5 -7.3 -3.0
   
Financing -0.2 24.7 -
17.6
4.9 1.5 7.3 3.0
  Onetime oil field concession  
     bonuses 
0.8 15.4 0.0 2.1 2.9 0.0 1.5
  Grants 2.5 4.0 2.3 2.3 0.0 0.8 0.1
  External funding (net) -
12.8
2.1 -4.8 -4.9 -5.1 3.3 3.9
      Disbursements 4.2 14.9 11.8 12.3 8.7 11.4 12.2
      Amortization -
17.7
-
12.8
-
16.8
-
17.3
-
13.0
-
9.8
-
3.9
     Short-term borrowing, net 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 -0.7 0 0
     Domestic financing (net) 9.2 3.3 -
15.1
5.5 3.7 3.2 -2.5
Source:  IMF 
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